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Abstract   Problems of scientific cosmology only rarely occur in the works of 
Karl Popper, the famous Austrian-British philosopher. Nevertheless, it was a 
subject that interested him and which he occasionally commented on. What is 
more important, his general claim of falsifiability as a criterion that 
demarcates science from non-science has played a significant role in periods of 
the development of modern physical cosmology. The paper examines the 
historical contexts of the interaction between cosmology and Popperian 
philosophy of science. Apart from covering Popper’s inspiration from Einstein 
and his views on questions of cosmology, it focuses on the impact of his 
thoughts in two periods of controversy of modern cosmology, the one related 
to the steady state theory and the other to the recent multiverse proposal. It 
turns out that the impact has been considerable, and continues to be so, but 
also that the versions of Popperian methodology discussed by cosmologists 
are sometimes far from what Popper actually thought and wrote. 
 
1  Introduction 
While Karl Popper’s philosophy of science has only few followers among 
modern philosophers, it is easily the view of science with the biggest impact 
on practicing scientists. According to Peter Medawar, Nobel laureate and 
eminent physiologist, Popper was the greatest authority ever on the scientific 
method. He praised the “great strength of Karl Popper’s conception of the 
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scientific process,” a main reason for the praise being “that is realistic – it 
gives a pretty fair picture of what goes on in real life laboratories.”1 Either 
explicitly or (more often) implicitly, many scientists subscribe to some 
version of simplified Popperianism, usually by adopting the demarcation 
criterion that a scientific theory must be falsifiable. This criterion has played 
an important role in science ever since the publication of The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery in 1959. One of the sciences where this continues to be the case is 
cosmology, which Popper once called “the most philosophically of all the 
sciences.”2 Yet his own comments on cosmological research were few and 
scattered, in marked contrast to the positive reception of his ideas in the 
community of physicists, astronomers, and cosmologists. 
 In this paper I deal in some detail with the interaction between 
Popper’s philosophy of science and developments in physical cosmology 
after World War II. This is a topic that has received little attention in either 
the historical or philosophical literature but deserves a closer examination.3 
Apart from examining what little can be found in Popper’s writings, I 
include in Section 5 some new information about his late opinion of 
cosmological models, as he described it in a hitherto unknown letter shortly 
before his death in 1994. The way in which Popperian methodology has 
influenced the development of cosmology is analyzed by looking in 
particular at two important controversies, the one (the steady state debate) 
dating from the 1950s and the other (the multiverse debate) from the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. It is hardly surprising that the version of 
Popperianism appearing in scientific cosmology, as in science in general, 
                                                          
1  Medawar (1990, p. 100). 
2  Popper (1994, p. 59). 
3  For the case of the steady state controversy, see Kragh (1996, pp. 244-246), and for 
the later impact of Popper’s ideas, Sovacool (2005). 
3 
 
differs quite substantially from what Popper himself believed and wrote. 
This study has two purposes: it aims at adding to the Popper scholarship by 
looking at Popper’s ideas of cosmology; and it aims at adding to the history 
of modern cosmology by investigating how Popper’s philosophical ideas 
influenced the development. Thus, it is placed at the crossroad between the 
histories of science and philosophy. 
 
2  Popper and Einstein 
In January 1921 eighteen-year old Popper listened to a public lecture Einstein 
gave in Vienna’s crowded Concert Hall, but the relativity theory that Einstein 
talked about “was quite beyond my understanding,” as he later recalled. Yet, 
shortly thereafter he was introduced to Einstein’s theory and what he called 
his “marvellous idea of a new cosmology – a finite but unbounded 
universe.”4 Although he did not develop an interest in this particular topic, 
he was greatly inspired by the general theory of relativity and Einstein’s 
attitude to observational tests. Einstein insisted that if there were conclusive 
evidence against a theory, it had to be abandoned. Referring to the prediction 
of a gravitational redshift, he wrote: “If the displacement of spectral lines 
towards the red by the gravitational potential does not exist, then the general 
theory of relativity will be untenable.”5 This was an attitude that impressed 
Popper and which he approvingly quoted in his autobiography.6 
                                                          
4  Popper (1974a, pp. 28-29). The friend who introduced him to Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity was a student of mathematics by the name Max Elstein. 
5  Einstein (1920, p. 132). Einstein (2004, p. 304) said the same in a letter to Eddington 
of 15 December 1919. See also Hentschel (1992), where Einstein’s attitude to 
empirical testing is analyzed and provided with documentary evidence. As pointed 
out by Holton (1998, p. 8), the earlier editions and printings of Einstein’s Über die 
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 Popper first published his later so famous demarcation criterion in a 
letter of 1933 to Erkenntnis, the journal for analytic philosophy founded a few 
years earlier by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It reads: “Statements, 
or systems of statements, convey information about the empirical world only 
if they are capable of clashing with experience; or more precisely, only if they 
can be subjected … to tests which might result in their refutation.”7 A few 
lines later he reformulated the demarcation criterion by paraphrasing a 
formulation by Einstein in an address of 1933: “In so far as a scientific 
statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and in so far as it is not 
falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.”8 A very similar formulation 
appeared in Popper’s extensive manuscript, Die beiden Grundprobleme der 
Erkenntnistheorie, which was only published in 1979.9  
At several occasions Popper described key elements in his 
philosophy of science as crucially relying on, or even derived from, 
Einsteinian physics and methodology. In a BBC radio programme he 
expressed his indebtedness to Einstein as follows: “Einstein’s influence on 
my thinking has been immense. I might even say that what I have done is 
mainly to make explicit certain points which are implicit in the work of 
Einstein. … The Einsteinian revolution has influenced my own views deeply: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
spezielle und allgemeine Relativitätstheorie (1917-1919) did not include either this 
sentence or something to the same effect. 
6  Popper (1974a, p. 29). 
7  Popper (1932-1933), as translated in Popper (1959, pp. 312-314). Quotation on p. 
313. 
8  Popper (1959, p. 313). In his address of 1921 on “Geometry and Experience,” 
Einstein (1962, p. 119) said: “In so far as the statements of mathematics refer to 
reality, they are uncertain; and in so far that they are certain, they do not refer to 
reality.”  
9  An English translation has only recently appeared: Popper (2008). 
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I feel I would never had arrived at them without him.”10 This is also what he 
said in his autobiography:  
 
What impressed me most was Einstein’s own clear statement that he 
would regard his theory as untenable if it should fail in certain tests. 
… Thus I arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the 
scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for 
verifications but for crucial tests; tests which could refute the theory 
tested, though they could never establish it.11 
 
However, his retrospective accounts of the genesis of his ideas on induction 
and demarcation should not be accepted uncritically. These ideas may not 
have had their roots in Einsteinian physics versus psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, but rather in Popper’s occupation with pedagogy and psychology. 
Moreover, he most likely arrived at the ideas only in 1929 or 1930, about a 
decade after he learned about Einstein’s attitude to critical tests.12 On the 
other hand, there is no reason to doubt Einstein’s crucial influence on 
Popper’s development of his philosophy. This influence is illustrated by the 
first edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, where Einstein is the second-
most cited author, whether scientist or philosopher. Only the German 
                                                          
10  Whitrow (1967, pp. 23-25).  
11  Popper (1974a, p. 29). Also in Popper (1963, p. 39) did he date the falsifiability 
criterion to the winter of 1919-1920. At the time it seemed “almost trivial” to him, 
and so it took thirteen years before he published it. 
12  See ter Hark (2002) and also Eggers Hansen (2006) from which it appears that still 
in 1927 Popper considered laws of nature to be verifiable and based on inductive 
reasoning. Only in Die beiden Grundprobleme did he reach the conclusion that laws of 
nature must be falsifiable and not verifiable. 
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logician and philosopher Rudolf Carnap, the leading figure in the Vienna 
positivist circle, received more references. 
 As to Einstein, he recognized in Popper a kindred spirit. Having read 
Logik der Forschung shortly after it appeared in the autumn of 1934, he wrote 
to Popper:  ”Your book has pleased me very much in many ways: rejection of 
the ’inductive method’ from an epistemological standpoint. Also falsifiability 
as the crucial element of a theory (of reality) … . You have further defended 
your positions really well and astutely.”13 He even offered to bring Popper’s 
book to the attention of his colleagues in physics and asked Popper of how 
he could best help him.  
 The close affinity between the views of Einstein and Popper, and 
therefore the reason why Einstein greeted Logik der Forschung with such 
sympathy, is perhaps best illustrated by an essay Einstein wrote in late 1919 
in the Berliner Tageblatt. Here he spelled out his conviction that the creative 
scientist must always start with a hypothesis, which may be nothing but a 
preconceived view of intuition. The scientist then deduces certain 
consequences from his hypothesis, and these can be confronted with nature:  
A theory can thus be recognized as erroneous [unrichtig] if there is a 
logical error in its deductions, or as incorrect [unzutreffend] if a fact is 
not in agreement with its consequences. But the truth of a theory can 
never be proven. For one never knows that even in the future no 
experience will be encountered which contradicts its consequences; 
                                                          
13  Einstein to Popper, 15 June 1935, as quoted in Van Dongen (2010, p. 43). 
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and still other systems of thought are always conceivable which are 
capable of joining together the same given facts.14 
 Also Einstein’s mature philosophy of science, as he formulated it in a letter 
of 1952 to his friend Maurice Solovine, was in broad agreement with 
Popper’s views.15 
 From 1937 to 1945 Popper stayed in Christchurch, New Zealand, 
where he taught philosophy at the University of Canterbury. He 
subsequently moved to England to take up a position at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science, and in 1949 he was appointed professor 
of logic and scientific method at the University of London. Einstein had since 
1933 been at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. It was only in 
1950, when invited to give a paper in Princeton on indeterminism in 
quantum physics, that Popper came to meet the physicist he admired so 
much. On this occasion he discussed, both with Einstein and Kurt Gödel, a 
cosmological model that Gödel had recently proposed on the basis of 
Einstein’s field equations and in which there was no cosmic time.16 Gödel’s 
strange universe was rotating and stationary – hence with no redshifts – and 
allowed for time travels into both the past and the future. Understandably, 
Einstein rejected the model as nothing but the brainchild of a clever 
mathematician. What matters here is that Popper seems to have been well 
                                                          
14  Einstein, “Induktion und Deduktion in der Physik,” Berliner Tageblatt, 25 
December 1919, reprinted in Einstein (2002, p. 219). English translation in Adam 
(2000), who discusses the significance of Einstein’s essay in relation to Popper’s 
views. However, Popper was unaware of the essay and only came to know about it 
in 1983, when the physicist and Einstein scholar John Stachel approached him on the 
matter. 
15  Einstein to Solovine, 7 May 1952, as analyzed in Holton (1998, pp. 28-56). 
16  For Gödel’s model universe and sources relevant to it, see Rindler (2009). 
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acquainted with Gödel’s model universe and its deficiencies, indicating that 
he was able to follow the technical literature in mathematical cosmology.17 
 It is debatable whether Einstein, in his scientific practice, can be 
characterized as a Popperian. Yet the affinity between his views and those of 
Popper was not limited to the rhetorical level, as may be illustrated by his 
response to the time-scale difficulty that plagued cosmology for more than 
twenty years. In most relativistic models of the expanding universe the age T 
is of the order of the Hubble time, or the inverse of the Hubble constant H. 
The problem was that the age, as derived in this way, was not only shorter 
than the age of the stars but also of the reliably determined age of the Earth. 
For example, according to the widely favoured Einstein-de Sitter model, the 
age is given by T = 2/3H, which resulted in T ≅ 1.2 billion years. There were 
ways to avoid the paradox, but Einstein insisted that the anomaly should be 
taken seriously and not be explained away. “The cosmologic theory here 
presented,” he wrote in 1945, referring to the relativistic big bang theory, 
“would be disproved if it were found to contradict any such results. In this 
case I can see no reasonable solution.”18 
 Einstein’s attitude was in the spirit of Popperian falsificationism, 
such as was his attitude in 1919 with respect to the gravitational bending of 
starlight. The “if” should be noticed, however, for it indicates that Einstein 
was not, after all, convinced that the cosmologically derived age of the 
universe was an incontrovertible fact. But this qualification, too, agrees with 
                                                          
17  See Popper (1974a, p. 172). 
18  Einstein (1956, p. 132), emphasis added. On the time-scale difficulty, see Kragh 
(1996, pp. 73-79, 271-275) and Brush (2001). The anomaly only disappeared in the 
1950s, when it was realized that the Hubble constant is much smaller than originally 




the view of Popper according to whom a scientist should not instantly 
abandon a theory that leads to disagreements with data (see Section 6). 
 
3  Physical cosmology in Popper’s work 
As we shall see in the following sections, Popper’s philosophy of science has 
played, and continues to play, an important role in methodological debates 
concerning cosmology. On the other hand, one looks in vain in his main 
works for discussions of the science of the universe. Quantum mechanics, 
special relativity theory, thermodynamics, and statistical physics appear 
prominently, and within these branches of foundational physics Popper’s 
contributions are still recognized as important.19 But he was nearly silent 
about cosmology in the meaning of space-time theories of the universe at 
large. The silence is not complete, though, for if one looks closely at his books 
and papers, questions of cosmology do turn up, if only briefly and scattered.  
 Before we look at these, it needs to be pointed out that while the term 
“cosmology” appears repeatedly in Popper’s writings, in far most of the 
cases it does not refer to scientific cosmology, whether of the physical, 
observational, or mathematical kind. “All science is cosmology,” he wrote in 
the preface to the English edition of Logik der Forschung that appeared in 1959 
as The Logic of Scientific Discovery.20 However, he used the term in a very 
broad sense, stating that the problem of cosmology was “the problem of 
understanding the world – including ourselves, and our knowledge, as part 
of the world.” This was a sense not very different from, for example, the one 
adopted by Alfred North Whitehead, whose main work, Process and Reality 
                                                          
19  See the survey in Jammer (1991). 
20  Popper (1959, p. 15). The sentence also appeared in some of his later works, e.g., 
Popper (1982, p. 1).  
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from 1929, carried the subtitle An Essay in Cosmology. When Popper dealt 
with the history of cosmological thought, it was not with developments in 
the twentieth century, but with the Presocratics, Plato, Copernicus, and 
Kant.21 Parmenides and Kant were his favourite cosmologists. In 1982 he said 
that his ideas about the quantum world had been inspired by “the problems 
of physical cosmology,” yet he used the term in a meaning entirely different 
from the one adopted by astronomers and physicists. Tellingly, his interest in 
what he called physical cosmology – but what others might perhaps call 
metaphysics or natural philosophy – led him “to biology, to the human 
mind, and to the products of the human mind.”22 
 In spite of his silence about scientific cosmology in Logik der 
Forschung, Popper was aware of the developments initiated by Einstein’s 
seminal paper of 1917 in which Einstein had applied his general theory of 
relativity to the entire universe. He seems to have been broadly aware of 
what happened in cosmology, but not to have followed the development 
closely. Shortly before  his death in 1994, he described himself as “an ardent 
admirer of Friedmann’s suggestion,” a reference to the Russian physicist 
Alexander Friedmann who in 1922 had shown that there are expanding and 
other dynamical solutions to Einstein’s cosmological field equations. 
According to Popper, Friedmann’s cosmology “made the explosion (now 
called the ‘Big Bang’) a simple explanation of all that was then ‘known 
empirically’ about the Universe.”23 Moreover, he considered it a 
                                                          
21  See, for example, the essay “Kant’s critique and cosmology,” reprinted in Popper 
(1963, pp. 175-183). The essay was first published in The Listener 51 (1954), 291-292, 
303. 
22  Popper (1982, p. 31). 
23  K. Popper to H. Kragh, 10 June 1994. The letter, presumably one of Popper’s last 
(he died on 17 September 1994), was a reply to some questions I had asked him in 
preparation of a book on the history of modern cosmology (Kragh 1996). It is now 
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simplification of Einstein’s original theory because it made the cosmological 
constant Λ an unnecessary assumption. 
 Only at one occasion, a little known paper of 1940 that has never 
been reprinted, did Popper enter the discussion in cosmology. At that time 
the Einstein-Friedmann theory was challenged by a very different system of 
cosmological physics proposed by E. Arthur Milne, a brilliant and 
unorthodox British astrophysicist. It was part of Milne’s system that physical 
events could be described in different time scales, leading to different but 
physically equivalent descriptions. For example, according to one time scale t 
the universe would expand, while according to another time scale τ, 
logarithmically related to the first (t ~ log τ), it would remain in a static 
state.24 Popper’s purpose with his letter in Nature was to discuss the generally 
accepted expansion of the universe in relation to theories that explained 
Edwin Hubble’s redshift data on the assumption of special mechanisms 
operating in a static universe. According to one alternative the speed of light 
decreased with time, while another alternative (the class of “tired light” 
hypotheses) assumed that light gradually lost energy during its journey 
through empty space from the nebulae to the Earth.  
 Clearly inspired by Milne, Popper examined two alternatives to the 
relativistic theory of cosmic expansion, arguing that they agreed in regard to 
observable effects, that is, they led to galactic redshifts of the kind predicted 
                                                                                                                                                                    
deposited at the Karl Popper Library, Klagenfurt University, Austria. The main 
content of the letter is quoted in a note forthcoming in the Journal for the History of 
Astronomy. Friedmann’s ideas of a universe evolving in time (which included both Λ 
= 0 and Λ ≠ 0) became generally known and accepted only after 1930, so Popper’s 
admiration presumably refers to the 1930s. For the early cosmologies of Einstein, de 
Sitter, Friedmann and others, see, for example, North (1965). 
24  On Milne’s system, known as the theory of “kinematic relativity,” see Lepeltier 
(2006) and Kragh (2011, pp. 101-108). For contemporary assessments from a 
philosophical point of view, see Cohen (1950) and Grünbaum (1952). 
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by the expansion theory. “The three theories are logically equivalent,” he 
wrote, “and therefore do not describe alternative facts, but the same facts in 
alternative languages.” But does the universe really expand? Or does the 
speed of light instead decrease? Or is it rather the case that the frequency of 
photons changes with the distance they travel? According to Popper, the 
question was “not more legitimate than, when prices of goods fall 
throughout the economic system, to ask whether ‘in reality’ the value of 
money has increased or the value of the goods has decreased.”25 
Nevertheless, he considered Milne’s alternative a simpler and therefore more 
attractive explanation of the observed redshifts. Popper’s intervention in the 
debate concerning the expanding universe did not arouse much attention. It 
seems to have received only one response, from the English astrophysicist 
and philosopher of science Herbert Dingle.26 
 At two other occasions did Popper take up topics of cosmological 
relevance, although in none of the cases in ways that directly related to 
research going on in scientific cosmology. In 1953 the newly established 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science announced a prize essay on “the 
logical and scientific status of the concept of the temporal origin and age of 
                                                          
25  Popper (1940, p. 70). According to Popper’s letter to the author (note 23), he was 
at the time interested in non-Doppler explanations of the redshifts and later 
published a remark in favour of redshifts increasing with distance because of 
collisions with particles in intergalactic space. I have been unable to trace this 
remark, which is not mentioned in any of the Popper bibliographies, and suspect 
that Popper’s memory failed him. 
26  Dingle (1940), who criticized Popper’s argument, accusing it of being an example 
of “a very dangerous tendency in modern physics, … , namely, a retreat from  
experience into the world of pure logic.” Dingle was an outspoken critic of Milne’s 
theory. He later became friendly with Popper, with whom he corresponded with 
regard to the validity of the special theory of relativity. See Hayes (2010). 
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the universe.”27 This was of course a central question in the controversy 
between the steady state theory and the big bang theory that was raging at 
the time. The twenty-six essays were judged by a committee including 
Popper, the other members being Harold Jeffreys (a mathematician and 
geophysicist), Fritz Paneth (a chemist), and Lancelot Whyte (a physicist and 
science writer). Half of the first prize in the competition was awarded the 
American philosopher Michael Scriven, who in his essay denied that it could 
be decided on a scientific basis whether the age of the universe is finite or 
infinite.28 Popper may have agreed. 
 The essay of the other prize winner, the physical chemist J. T. Davies 
of King’s College, London, is of interest because it demonstrates the 
influence of Popper’s ideas. In his discussion of how to choose between rival 
theories of the universe, Davies stressed that the ultimate test was to 
compare deductions with new observations. He referred twice to Popper’s 
Logik der Forschung, which he evidently had studied carefully: “Unless we 
can conceive of a critical observation which could distinguish between rival 
theories, the latter are either ‘unscientific’ or are stating the same thing in 
different guises. As Popper has emphasised, the criterion of a scientific 
theory is that it must be possible for an observational check to be devised 
(however impractical with existing techniques), by which it might be 
disproved.”29 
 If science were powerless to decide between an eternal and a finite-
age universe, perhaps there could be given philosophical and logical 
arguments that ruled out an infinite past? This is an old question, much 
                                                          
27  See British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (1953): 92; 5 (1954): 179, and Nature 
175 (1955): 68-69.  
28  Scriven (1954). See also Brush (2001, p. 168). 
29  Davies (1954, p. 199). 
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discussed already in the middle ages, and in 1978 the astronomer Gerald 
Whitrow argued from reasons of logic that an infinitely old universe is 
indeed impossible.30  Popper replied that such a priori reasoning was invalid 
and that the question might well be scientifically meaningless. Referring to 
Milne’s two time scales, by means of which a universe without a beginning 
could be transformed into one with a beginning, he wondered “whether 
there is an ontological difference corresponding to the difference between a 
time co-ordinate reaching into an infinite past and a time co-ordinate with a 
beginning.”31 His reasoning was thus of the same kind as in his paper of 
1940. Of course, by the late 1970s the big bang model had obtained a 
paradigmatic status and the large majority of cosmologists were convinced 
that the universe had existed for only a finite number of years. In his reply to 
Whitrow, Popper did not refer to the physical arguments for a finite-age 
universe, but he implicitly denied that these rigorously proved a big bang 
universe of finite age. As far as he was concerned, the universe might have 
existed for an infinity of time. 
 Much interested in questions of the direction of time and the 
irreversibility of physical processes, in the period 1956-1967 Popper wrote 
several papers on these and related subjects in Nature and the British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science. The problem of the so-called arrow of time is a 
classical one in natural philosophy, and it is no less important in 
foundational physics. Does the second law of thermodynamics provide an 
arrow of time? Or do the laws of electrodynamics perhaps provide one? The 
                                                          
30  Whitrow (1978). 
31  Popper (1978). See also Craig (1979), who responded to the arguments of 
Whitrow and Popper and related them to contemporary developments in physical 
cosmology. Craig suggested that Popper’s arguments were unconvincing and that 
modern cosmology and astrophysics confirmed that the age of the universe was of 
the order ten billion years.  
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question entered cosmology in the 1960s, when several physicists and 
cosmologists discussed the expansion of the universe as a cosmological 
arrow of time and how it related to the one based on electromagnetic signals. 
Some advocates of the steady state programme, including Fred Hoyle, Jayant 
Narlikar, and Dennis Sciama, argued that only the steady state theory was 
able to explain why we live in a world with a sharp difference between 
signals coming from the past and from the future.32 
 At about the same time that the arrow of time problem was 
discussed among cosmologists, Popper examined it independently and from 
a more general perspective. In a paper of 1965 he argued that the entropic 
theory of time, according to which the growth of entropy as given by 
thermodynamics defines the direction of time, was unfounded and in any 
case of no cosmological significance.33 Radiation processes, he suggested, 
were the only irreversible processes that were relevant on a cosmic scale. At a 
later occasion he explained that when he insisted that time has an arrow, it 
was to emphasize that the universe has a history: “’The present age of the 
universe’ is a perfectly good term in cosmology. … In other words, the past, 
present, and future are perfectly good terms in cosmology and astronomy.”34 
Popper’s approach was primarily philosophical, and he did not relate his 
work on the arrow of time to the contemporary debate in the small 
community of cosmologists. 
 In a rejoinder of 1967 to critical objections raised by a German 
philosopher, W. Büchel, Popper expanded his discussion of irreversibility to 
                                                          
32  See Kragh (1996, pp. 368-372) and Sánchez-Ron (1990). 
33  Popper (1965). For a critical discussion of Popper’s view, see Esfeld (2006). 
34  Popper (1974b, p. 1143). The complex of problems Popper dealt with continues to 
attract scientific and philosophical interest. See, for example, the contributions in 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37: 3 (2006), a special issue on the 
arrows of time. 
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cover some of the relativistic models of the universe, including the cyclic 
model that Einstein had proposed in 1931.35 For this particular case, which 
assumes a positive curvature of space, he admitted that the entropy would 
increase continually. The 1967 note demonstrates that Popper had a clear 
grasp of the essence of relativistic cosmology and also indicates that he did 
not believe in a universe of the cyclic type. In the case of Λ = 0, a positive 
space curvature necessitates an average mass density ρ greater than a certain 
value known as the critical density and given by ρcrit = 3H2/κ, where H is 
Hubble’s expansion parameter and κ Einstein’s gravitational constant related 
to Newton’s constant G by κ = 8πG/c2. Popper apparently thought that the 
condition ρ > ρcrit was an untestable hypothesis, or rather that Einstein 
thought so. Relying on Einstein’s The Meaning of Relativity, Popper wrote: 
“He [Einstein] regarded the conjecture ρ > 3H2/κ as untestable, and the 
opposite conjecture as testable or refutable, which might make it preferable 
to some.”36 
 As Einstein pointed out, the gravitating mass density ρ is likely to 
consist of two components, one due to nebulae and other radiating matter ρr 
and another to non-radiating or dark matter ρd. The total mass density and 
therefore the curvature of space will depend on ρ = ρr + ρd or ρd/ρr. If ρr < ρcrit, 
we may still have ρ > ρcrit, a positive curvature. Einstein showed that the 
lower bound for ρ will depend on ρd/ρr, a quantity which can be estimated 
from the spectroscopically determined velocities of the galaxies in a globular 
cluster. “On the other hand,” he wrote, “I cannot think of any reasonably 
reliable determination of an upper bound for ρ.” Popper seems to have read 
Einstein as saying that a closed universe cannot be falsified, for the only way 
                                                          
35  Popper (1967). Büchel (1967).   
36  Popper (1967). Einstein (1956, pp. 131-132). Notice Popper’s identification of 
“testable” and “refutable.” 
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will be to show that ρ ≤ ρcrit; and even if it is shown that ρr ≤ ρcrit it can always 
be argued that ρ = ρr + ρd > ρcrit. 
 At about the time Popper wrote his 1967 note to Nature, there had 
occurred something like a paradigm shift in cosmology, with the emergence 
of the standard hot big bang theory. Popper did not comment explicitly on 
the new physical cosmology, but in a few cases he indicated his view. In a 
plenary lecture on “The Theory of the Objective Mind” delivered in 1968 to 
the 14th International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna, he briefly dealt 
with cosmological models – “the most interesting kind of all hypotheses,” he 
called them. Some of these, he said, “can of course be tested, and some have 
been even sufficiently precise for refutation. But others, and very interesting 
ones, seem to be untestable, and may remain so.”37 He may have thought of 
the steady state theory and the new big bang theory, respectively, but did not 
elaborate. In a more general way Popper referred to “the infinitely 
improbable” success of modern cosmology in the 1974 festschrift issued in 
the Library of Living Philosophers series. He said: 
Our theories tell us that the world is almost completely empty, and 
that empty space is filled with chaotic radiation. And almost all 
places which are not empty are occupied either by chaotic dust, or by 
gases, or by very hot stars – all in conditions which seem to make the 
application of any physical method of acquiring knowledge 
impossible. … Modern cosmology teaches us that to generalize from 
                                                          
37  Popper (1972, p. 186). First published 1968 in German, in the proceedings of the 
Vienna international congress.  
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observations taken, for the most part, in our incredibly idiosyncratic 
region of the universe would almost always be quite invalid.38 
From what little Popper wrote about cosmology one gets the feeling that he 
did not like the standard big bang theory. At a conference in 1972 he 
admitted that the theory was “at present the most widely accepted theory of 
the origin of the universe,” but in his view it was nonetheless highly 
precarious. The cosmological origin of the content of helium in the universe 
he called a “speculation.” Popper indicated some sympathy for a recent 
proposal that did not presuppose either a big bang or an expanding 
universe.39 More generally he considered cosmology and cosmogony – 
“though immensely fascinating parts of physics” – to be somewhat immature 
sciences, which, “though they are becoming better testable, are still almost 
borderline cases of physical science.”40 
 Popper’s most explicit public comments on modern cosmology 
appeared in a lecture given in 1982 at the European Alpbach Forum in 
Alpbach, Austria. Cosmology – “the most philosophically important of all 
the sciences,” he repeated – had undergone a revolutionary development 
during the last few decades. He praised the by then defunct Bondi-Gold-
Hoyle theory as “a very fine and promising theory,” not because it was true 
but because it was testable and had in fact been falsified. As a result of 
measurements based on methods of radio astronomy, “it seems to have been 
refuted in favour of the (older) big bang theory of expansion.” Popper did 
                                                          
38  Popper (1974b, p. 1027). Since Popper wrote this, the universe has turned even 
more exotic and the success of cosmology even more improbable. The universe is no 
longer almost completely empty, but filled with dark energy and dark matter. 
39  He referred to Pecker, Roberts and Vigier (1972), who proposed inelastic photon-
photon interaction as an explanation of galactic redshifts. 
40  Popper (1974c, pp. 267-268), based on a lecture given at a conference on 
reductionism in biology in Bellagio, Italy, 9-16 September 1972.  
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not mention the cosmic microwave background radiation or other evidence 
(such as the measured amount of helium in the universe) that had laid the 
steady state theory in the grave. Without speaking out against the big bang 
theory, he remarked that “we seem to be almost as helpless in the field of 
cosmology in the face of some of these revolutionary results as we are in 
politics when faced with the task of making peace.”41 
 Given that radio astronomy represented “a most exciting and 
revolutionary episode in the history of cosmology,” Popper found it 
pertinent to suggest that the discovery of the method did not originate from 
the technical invention of an instrument, the radio telescope. No, it was the 
idea of using radio waves emitted by stellar bodies that was important, 
because “I believe that the history of science is essentially a history of 
ideas.”42 The remark underlines how little appreciation Popper had for 
discoveries based on advances in experimental and observational techniques. 
He was interested in the “logic of scientific discovery,” but discoveries 
themselves were foreign to his system of philosophy. This system portrayed 
science as a series of critical discussions, not of real discoveries made in the 
laboratory or in the astronomical observatory. As the Australian philosopher 
David Store quipped, in Popper any “actual discovery would be as out of 
place as a hippopotamus in a philosophy class.”43 
 Moreover, according to Popper experiments and observations are 
wholly subordinated ideas and theories. Science starts with problems rather 
                                                          
41  Popper (1994, pp. 58-60). Even before the discovery of the cosmic microwave 
background in 1965, the steady state theory was contradicted by surveys of radio 
sources made by Martin Ryle and others, which evidently impressed Popper. For 
this method and its role in the refutation of the steady state theory, see Kragh (1996, 
pp. 305-317, 323-331). 
42  Popper (1994, p. 59). 
43  Stove (1982, p. 13). 
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than with observations. What he called his epistemological theory of 
experiment was this: “The theoretician puts certain definite questions to the 
experimenter, and the latter, by his experiments, tries to elicit a decisive 
answer to these questions, and to no others. … Thus it is he [the theoretician] 
who shows the experimenter the way.”44 Perhaps it was this attitude that 
caused him to ignore the discovery of the cosmic microwave background 
and its crucial role in the revival of the big bang universe. The Nobel Prize-
rewarded discovery of Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson was serendipitous 
and not motivated by theory at all.45 It was not a discovery that fitted into 
Popper’s epistemological theory of experiment. 
 
4  The controversy over the steady state model 
The steady state theory of the universe aroused a great deal of philosophical 
interest, in part because of the theory’s controversial claim of continual 
creation of matter and more generally because of its appeal to philosophy 
and methods of science. For example, in their paper of 1948 Bondi and Gold 
argued that the new steady state theory was preferable from a 
methodological point of view, as it was simpler, more direct, and more 
predictive than the cosmological theories based on general relativity. The 
latter class of theories, they said, was “utterly unsatisfactory” since it covered 
a whole spectrum of theories that could only be confronted with the 
observed universe if supplied with more or less arbitrary assumptions and 
parameters: “In general relativity a very wide range of models is available 
and the comparisons [between theory and observation] merely attempt to 
find which of these models fits the facts best. The number of free parameters 
                                                          
44  Popper (1959, p. 107). 
45  On this discovery and its consequences, see Kragh (1996, pp. 343-355). 
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is so much larger than the number of observational points that a fit certainly 
exists and not even all the parameters can be fixed.”46 Relativistic cosmology 
sorely lacked the deductive character of the steady state theory, which 
uniquely led to a number of predictions, such as the mean density of matter, 
the curvature of space, and the average age of galaxies. According to Bondi 
and Gold (but not Hoyle), the predictions were essentially based on the so-
called “perfect cosmological principle,” the postulate that there is neither a 
privileged place nor a privileged time in the universe.  
 Whether in the Bondi-Gold or the Hoyle version, the steady state 
theory was critically discussed by many philosophers and philosophically 
minded astronomers and physicists. To the first category belonged Adolf 
Grünbaum, Mario Bunge, Milton Munitz, Norwood Russell Hanson, and 
Rom Harré, and to the latter Dingle, Whitrow, William McCrea, and William 
Davidson. Much of the methodological discussion in the 1950s focused on 
the criteria on which to judge the scientific nature of the steady state theory, 
or of cosmology in general.47 It was in this context that Popper’s demarcation 
criterion came to play a role in the cosmological debate. The leading 
Popperian cosmologist in the period was undoubtedly Hermann Bondi, at 
the time professor of applied mathematics at King’s College, London. While 
Bondi took Popper very seriously indeed, the more unphilosophical Hoyle 
did not.48 His post-1960 modifications of the steady state theory, developed 
                                                          
46  Bondi and Gold (1948, p. 269 and p. 262). On the philosophical foundation of the 
steady state theory, see also Balashov (1994). 
47  For this discussion and relevant references to the literature, see Kragh (1996, pp. 
224-256). 
48  To my knowledge, Hoyle only referred once to Popper, and then in connection 
with the anthropic principle and not the steady state cosmology. At a conference of 
1989, he defended the anthropic principle “if our existence leads to a potentially 
falsifiable prediction in the sense of Popper.” See Hoyle (1993, p. 85). 
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in collaboration with Narlikar, were most un-Popperian, which was a major 
reason why Bondi would have nothing to do with them. 
 Although Popper’s philosophical views only became generally 
known with the publication in 1959 of Logic of Scientific Discovery, among 
philosophers and some scientists they had attracted attention at an earlier 
date. The “surprisingly successful” Logik der Forschung was favourably 
received and reviewed also in English journals, and as a consequence Popper 
was invited to England in 1935 to give lectures.49 Bondi may have become 
acquainted with Popper’s views through the German original. Himself an 
Austrian immigrant – he came to England in 1937 and became a British 
subject in 1946 – he may have read Logik der Forschung in the late 1940s.50 At 
any rate, he had adopted Popperian standards of science and used them in 
the cosmological debate even before 1959. Thus, in the British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science of February 1954 Bondi and Whitrow engaged in a 
public discussion about the scientific status of physical cosmology. In this 
memorable exchange of ideas, Bondi defended the optimistic view that 
cosmology had already become a science on par with other sciences, while 
Whitrow, stressing the unique domain of cosmology, argued that it was not 
truly scientific and probably never would be so. It would remain, he thought, 
a borderland subject between science and philosophy. Bondi, on the other 
hand, suggested that the hallmark of science was falsifiability of theories and 
                                                          
49  Popper (1974a, pp. 86-88). Although widely read, the book only sold in a few 
hundred copies. On the impact of the book and the reactions it occasioned, see 
Hacohen (2002). 
50  According to a letter from H. Bondi to H. Kragh, January 1995. In his obituary of 
Popper, Bondi (1994) wrote that “His seminal work in the philosophy of science … 
became available in English only in 1959, but its principal ideas were already well 
appreciated in the English-speaking countries by that time.” At an earlier occasion, 
Popper’s eightieth birthday, Bondi (1982) recalled that it was “thirty years ago, 
when I was first so deeply and lastingly influenced by Popper’s analysis.”  
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that on this criterion cosmology was indeed a science. “Every advocate of 
any [cosmological] theory will always be found to stress especially the 
supposedly excellent agreement between the forecasts of his theory and the 
sparse observational results,” he admitted. And yet, 
The acceptance of the possibility of experimental and observational 
disproof of any theory is as universal and undisputed in cosmology as 
in any other science, and, though the possibility of logical disproof is 
not denied in cosmology, it is not denied in any other science either. By 
this test, the cardinal test of any science, modern cosmology must be 
regarded as a science. … I consider universal acceptance of the 
possibility of experimental disproof of any claim an absolute test of 
what constitutes a science.51 
Although not mentioning Popper by name, Bondi was clearly defending a 
main methodological point in Popperian philosophy. Whitrow, who was also 
well acquainted with Popper’s views, did not disagree, although he warned 
that falsifiability should not be considered a final and absolute criterion: “The 
important role of disproof in science, which has been so cogently argued by 
K. R. Popper, is intimately related to the self-correcting tendency of science 
and this, in my view, is another aspect of the pursuit of unanimity.”52 A few 
years later, in an article on philosophical problems of cosmology, Bondi 
repeated that the scientific status of a theory was given by its ability to 
produce predictions that could be empirically disproved. This, he argued, 
                                                          
51  Whitrow and Bondi (1954, p. 279 and p. 282). For the Bondi-Whitrow discussion, 
see also Kragh (1996, pp. 233-237). 
52  Whitrow and Popper (1954, p. 280). 
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established the scientific status of the perfect cosmological principle and 
hence of the steady state theory building on it.53  
 Both in the debate with Whitrow and at some later occasions, Bondi 
seems to have conceived Popper’s methods as prescriptions to be 
implemented in concrete scientific work, which may not be what Popper had 
in mind. Whitrow put more emphasis on the asymmetry between proof and 
disproof being purely logical, whereas in scientific practice a conclusive 
disproof or falsification can never be produced. Indeed, this was clearly 
recognized by Popper.54 In practice it was also recognized by Bondi and other 
steady state protagonists, who in concrete cases, such as when confronted 
with Ryle’s data from radio astronomy, denied that falsifying evidence 
amounted to actual disproof of the theory. They did not always behave in 
accordance with what they perceived to be Popperian standards.55 
 Latest by 1960, Bondi had become a convinced and enthusiastic 
advocate of Popper’s philosophy, such as is evident from a glowing review 
essay he wrote of The Logic of Scientific Discovery together with his colleague 
at King’s College, the mathematical physicist Clive Kilmister. The two 
physicists were full of praise of Popper’s “splendid book,” which they found 
was so well written that it was “almost desirable bed-time reading.” More 
importantly, its main appeal to scientists was that it “rings true.” According 
to the two reviewers, “Popper speaks as a working scientist to the working 
scientist in a language that time and again comes straight out of one’s 
                                                          
53  Bondi (1957). In a postscript of 1963 to the second edition published in 1966, 
Bondi referred to the cosmological significance of some recent developments in 
nuclear astrophysics. Expressing himself in Popperian language, he said that “the 
steady-state theory has effectively passed a severe test.”  
54  Popper (1959, p. 50). See also Section 5. 
55  Kragh (1996, pp. 327-328). 
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heart.”56 Bondi and Kilmister did not miss the opportunity to point out the 
relevance of the Popperian falsifiability criterion to the contemporary 
situation in cosmology. According to Popper, “Once a hypothesis has been 
proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to 
drop out without ‘good reason’,” which quotation Bondi and Kilmister used 
as an argument for the steady state theory.57 A “good reason” might be the 
replacement of the hypothesis by another, better testable one, and no such 
alternative existed. Speaking of the steady state theory: “For here the correct 
argument has always been that the steady state model was the one that could 
be disproved most easily by observation. Therefore, it should take 
precedence over other less disprovable ones until it has been disproved. 
Twenty years before the introduction of this hypothesis, Popper [in 1934] 
formulated the conditions with the utmost accuracy.”  
 At about the same time as Bondi studied The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, he participated in two BBC broadcasts on modern cosmology 
together with William Bonnor, Raymond Lyttleton, and Whitrow. In the 
published version, he once again paid tribute to Popper as the preeminent 
philosopher of science, summarizing his view as follows: 
By far the most successful analysis of scientific method is due to 
Professor Karl Popper. … The purpose of a theory is to make forecasts 
that can be checked against observation and experiment. A scientific 
theory is one that it is in principle possible to disprove by empirical 
means. It is this supremacy of empirical disproof that distinguishes 
science from other human activities. We can never regard a theory as 
                                                          
56  Bondi and Kilmister (1959-1960, p. 55). 
57  Ibid. p. 56. Popper (1959, p. 53). North (1965, pp. 294-295), discusses the meaning 
of Popper’s quote and the use made of it by Bondi and Kilmister. 
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proved, because all we can say is that, so far, there have been no 
experiments contradicting it. A scientific theory, to be useful, must be 
testable and vulnerable.58 
From the mid-1960s, after the steady state theory had fallen in disfavour, 
Bondi increasingly turned to studies of gravitational radiation and other 
problems of general relativity. But he was not yet quite ready to abandon his 
preferred cosmological model, which he continued to defend for some time 
from a methodological point of view rather than as a viable scientific model 
of the universe. Without embracing the victorious big bang theory, he 
admitted that the battle was lost. The steady state model might be wrong, but 
it was nevertheless more scientific than the relativistic big bang theories: 
“The steady-state theory is far more testable than any other. According to 
Popper and other philosophers of science, this makes it clearly preferable to 
alternative theories. The only open question is whether it has indeed already 
been disproved.”59 Bondi’s high appreciation of Popper’s philosophy was 
strengthened by his work on steady state cosmology, but it did not depend 
on it. Even after having abandoned cosmology as a research field, he 
continued to praise Popper’s system in the strongest possible words, such as: 
“There is no more to science than its method, and there is no more to its 
method than Popper has said.”60 On the occasion of Popper’s 90th birthday, 
                                                          
58  Bondi (1960, p. 12). While Bonnor, a theoretical physicist at Queen Elizabeth 
College, London, opposed the steady state model, the Cambridge astronomer 
Lyttleton was in favour of it. At the time he collaborated with Bondi and Gold on a 
new “electrical” version of the steady state theory. On this cosmological hypothesis, 
vulnerable to experimental disproof and indeed quickly disproved, see Kragh 
(1997). 
59  Bondi (1966, p. 32). 
60  As reported by the philosopher Bryan Magee in his biography of Popper. See 
Magee (1973, p. 2), which gives no source for the quotation. 
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Bondi spoke in a similar laudatory language, stating that Popper’s view of 
empirical disproof “has profoundly influenced me and many others.”61 
Finally, in an obituary in Nature: “Although many scientists have little 
interest in the philosophy of science, … to me his thoughts came as a flash of 
brilliant light.”62 
 Although Popperian criteria of science played a considerable role 
during the cosmological controversy, and were highlighted by the steady 
state proponents in particular, they were rarely an issue of dispute. By and 
large, criteria of a Popperian kind were accepted also by many cosmologists 
favouring an evolving universe governed by the laws of general relativity. 
One of them was George McVittie, a British-American astronomer strongly 
opposed to the steady state theory and other theories he suspected were 
based on a priori principles. He described the philosophical foundation of 
the Bondi-Gold theory as “Karl Popper’s dictum that a scientific theory can 
never be proved to be true but, instead, that certain theories can be proved to 
be false by an appeal to observation.” While he considered the dictum to be a 
“probably unimpeachable doctrine,” he parodied Bondi’s use of it. If one 
followed Bondi’s vulgar version of Popper’s philosophy, “we should be 
justified in inventing a theory of gravitation which would prove that the 
orbit of every planet was necessarily a circle. The theory would be most 
vulnerable to observation and could, indeed, be immediately shot down.”63 
 Also Bonnor referred to Popperian standards in his defense of 
relativistic cosmology, maintaining that it was in fact empirically refutable, if 
admittedly not as easily or crucially as the steady state alternative. “Indeed, 
                                                          
61  Bondi (1992). 
62  Bondi (1994). 




if the steady-state theory is right, then relativistic cosmology is wrong, and, 
in my opinion, we have to scrap general relativity as well,” he wrote. But he 
did not see it as a question bearing on Popper’s criterion: “I make this point 
because every scientific theory must be capable of disproof; otherwise it says 
nothing.”64   
 
5  Popper’s late views of cosmological models 
As mentioned in Section 3, Popper was to some extent sympathetic to the 
steady state theory, of which he was well informed. Concerning his attitude 
to this theory, in his letter to me of 1994 he wrote as follows:65 
I discussed the controversial position with Bondi in considerable detail, 
and so I was quite well informed; but I did not read those papers of his. 
Incidentally, I liked his theory, but not the so-called “cosmological 
principle” and even less its (temporal) extension. (Because I dislike 
making of our lack of knowledge a principle of knowing something.) I 
therefore was not shocked when Ryle “killed” the theory, for he only 
killed this temporal extension of a “principle” that had nothing to do 
with the basic idea of the Bondi-Gold theory: that matter might be 
created out of some field and so keep the universe going – more or less 
“steady”. For since mass-creation was a random process anyway, there 
was no need to assume that it was “steady” over comparatively “small” 
parts of the universe (even if we assume that it was “steady” over 
“large” parts – whatever “large” may mean): the propensity of creating 
                                                          
64  Bonnor (1964, p. 158). 
65  See note 23. Popper divided his letter in five parts, denoted (1) to (5). I have not 
included this numbering in the transcription. The letter is now deposited at the Karl 
Popper Collection at the University Library in Klagenfurt, Austria.  
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a proton (or electron, or some other particle) may depend on (the 
gravitational? Or the electromagnetic?) fields linked with the nearest 
galaxies explaining galactic (?) evolution and offering an answer to 
Ryle’s arguments. 
While Popper thus was sympathetic to a version of steady state theory, if not 
to the original Bondi-Gold theory based on the perfect cosmological 
principle, he came to dislike and reject the victorious big bang theory. About 
this he wrote: 
I not only liked the idea of a more or less “steady” mass creation much 
better than the big bang – for obvious reasons: I mean the inexplicability 
of a beginning of time. But also because big bang theory became rapidly 
more and more complicated. And my present view is that the number 
of auxiliary hypotheses is simply intolerable: according to my theory of 
science, this is not science. It is (1) introducing a new auxiliary hypothesis 
every time the theory is refuted; and (2), it is mutual support of 
cosmological theory and particle theory – but criticism, and critical 
experiments (= attempted refutations) are ignored out of hand. And not 
only is it not stressed by the upholders of the theory that it is all 
speculation without tests, but it is presented as if the theory were a 
proven fact. This is horrid; impermissible; against scientific ethics.  
 By contrast, Einstein’s General Relativity is a marvelous theory. 
But it may be superseded, as all theories may; and I actually suspect 
that it may be superseded already. But these are big problems, and I 
cannot now go i[n]to discussing them. 
Popper summed up his attitude to cosmology as follows: 
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I once was an enthusiastic admirer of (Friedmann’s) Big Bang. I am now 
a disgusted opponent. As to the “steady state” theory, it is insufficiently 
developed, and Ryle’s criticism insufficiently discussed. And the 
“cosmological principles” were, I fear, dogmas that should not have 
been proposed. 
It is noteworthy that Popper’s main objection to the classical steady state 
theory was the perfect cosmological principle, which he considered 
unscientific and dogmatic. He wanted to replace it with matter creation. 
Bondi and Gold, on the other hand, stressed the scientific nature of the 
falsifiable perfect cosmological principle and regarded it as primary relative 
to the continual creation of matter. According to them, matter creation was a 
direct consequence of the perfect cosmological principle when combined 
with the observationally established expansion of the universe. Without this 
principle, cosmology could not be truly scientific.66 It is also worth to observe 
that much of Popper’s criticism of the big bang theory agreed with the 
objections raised by Hoyle and others at about the same time. This criticism 
led to the so-called quasi steady state cosmology (QSSC), which Popper, had 
he known about it, might have found a more satisfactory theory of the 
universe.67 
 
6  The influence of Popperian philosophy 
Popper’s falsificationist philosophy has been influential in a broad range of 
sciences, from botany to theoretical cosmology. According to David Stove, a 
                                                          
66  “If it does not hold, … cosmology is no longer a science.” Bondi and Gold 1948, p. 
255. 
67  A full description of the QSSC alternative is given in Hoyle, Burbidge, and 
Narlikar 2000. See also Kragh (2011, pp. 133-137). 
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critic of Popper, “if you scratch a scientist of middle age or older, you are 
almost certain to meet with a philosophy of science which consists of half-
remembered scraps of Popperism.”68 The influence of falsificationist 
philosophy à la Popper varies of course from one science to another, and it 
may be particularly strong in the astronomical sciences. According to a study 
by Benjamin Sovacool, astronomers and cosmologists often invoke Popper’s 
ideas as a guide for constructing and evaluating theories, although they 
rarely reveal a deeper familiarity with these ideas.69 In addition to what has 
already been mentioned, a few more examples will indicate the enduring 
influence of Popperian methodology at least on the rhetorical level. In a 
review article on the comparative merits of standard big bang cosmology 
and QSSC theory, Narlikar and his coauthor T. Padmanabhan emphasize the 
crucial role of tests in distinguishing between cosmological models:  
What test can be performed that could in principle disprove this 
[standard or QSSC] cosmology? This question is in the spirit of Karl 
Popper’s view of a scientific theory, that it should be disprovable. 
Thus if such a test is performed and its results disagree with the 
prediction of the theory, the theory is considered disproved. If the 
theory seeks survival by adding an extra parametric dimension, that 
is against the spirit of this question. On the other hand, if the 
prediction is borne out, our confidence in the theory may be 
enhanced, but the theory still cannot be considered proven.70 
By these standards Narlikar and Padmanabhan consider standard relativistic 
cosmology to be a scientific theory because there are tests that are “decisive 
                                                          
68  Stove (1999, p. 8). 
69  Sovacool (2005). 
70  Narlikar and Padmanabhan (2001, p. 241). 
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in disproving or strongly discrediting” the theory. As another example, in a 
review of the state of cosmology at the millennium, the American 
astrophysicist Michael Turner advocated the new standard model of the 
universe, including the cosmological constant and dark matter, by appealing 
to its methodological virtues: “However, with its unidentified dark matter 
and mysterious dark energy, it is currently very much out on a limb. 
According to Karl Popper that’s what strong theories do! … Inflation + cold 
dark matter is bold and testable.”71  
 Stephen Hawking, the celebrated cosmologist and theoretical 
physicist, rates highly the power of mathematical elegance and logical 
consistency in theory construction. While these are the crucial sources in the 
context of discovery, in the context of justification the theory needs to be 
confronted with nature. In his best-selling A Brief History of Time, Hawking 
wrote:  
Any physical theory is always provisional, in the sense that it is only 
a hypothesis: you can never prove it. ... On the other hand, you can 
disprove a theory by finding even a single observation that disagrees 
with the predictions of the theory. As philosopher of science Karl 
Popper has emphasized, a good theory is characterized by the fact 
that it makes a number of predictions that could in principle be 
disproved or falsified by observation. Each time new experiments are 
observed to agree with the predictions the theory survives, and our 
confidence in it is increased; but if ever a new observation is found to 
disagree, we have to abandon or modify the theory.72 
                                                          
71  Turner (2001, p. 656). 
72  Hawking (1989, p. 11). 
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Hawking realized that this is a normative prescription rather than a 
description of real research practices, and that consequently it has to be 
qualified: “Or rather, that is what is supposed to happen. In practice, people 
are very reluctant to give up a theory in which they have invested a lot of 
time and effort. They usually start by questioning the accuracy of the 
observations. If that fails, they try to modify the theory in an ad hoc 
manner.”73 While the first of Hawking’s quotations is a paraphrase of 
Popper’s philosophy, the second one may appear to deviate from Popperian 
standards.  
 But it does not, for Popper did not claim that these standards 
reflected the actual practices of scientists. First of all, he never held that 
falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a theory being scientific, but only 
that it is a necessary condition. He knew well that the demarcation criterion 
cannot be very sharp, but must be assigned degrees, a topic to which he 
devoted a whole chapter in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.74 Although 
somewhat ambiguous with regard to the relationship between his 
methodological rules and scientific practice, he admitted that strict 
falsifiability does not belong to the real world of science: 
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be 
produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental 
results are not reliable, or that the discrepancies which are asserted to 
exist between the experimental results and the theory are only 
apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our 
understanding. … If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in 
                                                          
73  Hawking (1994, p. 36). A sentence to the same effect followed the previous 
quotation: “At least, that is what is supposed to happen, but you can always 
question the competence of the person who carried out the observation.”  
74  Popper (1959, pp. 112-145). 
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the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and 
never learn from it how wrong you are.75 
Again, in a section in the 1974 festschrift on “Difficulties of the Demarcation 
Proposal” Popper made it clear that he did not assign any absolute value to 
the criterion of falsifiability and did not consider it a definition of science. He 
recognized that the distinction between metaphysics and science is often 
blurred. “What was a metaphysical idea yesterday can become a testable 
theory tomorrow,” such as happened with speculative atomism at the time of 
Dalton.76 Far from elevating falsificationism to an inviolable principle, he 
suggested that it is itself fallible and that it may be rational to keep even an 
admittedly wrong theory alive for some time: 
There is a legitimate place for dogmatism, though a very limited 
place. He who gives up his theory too easily in the face of apparent 
refutations will never discover the possibilities inherent in his theory. 
There is room in science for debate: for attack and therefore also for 
defence. Only if we try to defend them can we learn all the different 
possibilities inherent in our theories. As always, science is conjecture. 
You have to conjecture when to stop defending a favourite theory, 
and when to try a new one.77 
                                                          
75 Ibid., p. 50. In a note appended to the English edition, Popper remarked that “I 
have been constantly misinterpreted as upholding a criterion (and moreover one of 
meaning rather than of demarcation) based upon a doctrine of ‘complete’ or 
‘conclusive’ falsifiability.” On the ambiguity between the prescriptive and 
descriptive in Popper’s writings, see Mulkay and Gilbert (1981). 
76  Popper (1974b, p. 981). In Popper (1959, p. 38), he referred to atomism as an 
example illustrating that “scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas 
which are of a purely speculative kind.” 
77  Popper (1974b, p. 984). 
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The same theme appeared in Popper’s autobiography, where he, referring to 
his early studies, said: “I also realized that we must not exclude all 
immunizations, not even all which introduce ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. … 
All this shows not only that some degree of dogmatism is fruitful, even in 
science, but also that logically speaking falsifiability, or testability, cannot be 
regarded as a very sharp criterion.”78 The view indicated by these quotes is 
indeed far from the strict or naïve falsificationism often discussed by 
scientists either for or against Popper.  
 The allegiance to Popperian standards among cosmologists may be 
further illustrated by a new cyclic model of the infinite universe that was 
proposed in 2002 by Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok as an alternative to the 
popular inflationary theory. In their efforts to promote the cyclic cosmology 
Steinhardt and Turok emphasized its falsifiability in the form of predictions 
of details in the cosmic microwave background. These details differ from 
those predicted by the rival inflationary theory and are of such a kind that, if 
they are not found, “then this would support the inflationary picture and 
definitively rule out the cyclic model.”79 An example of a different kind is the 
Israeli physicist Benjamin Gal-Or’s Cosmology, Physics, and Philosophy, a 
textbook that ambitiously aims at integrating the three subjects. Although 
heavily influenced by Popper’s philosophy, which it quotes extensively, in 
                                                          
78  Popper (1974a, p. 32). The reference to “immunizations” is to attempts to protect a 
theory against refutation.  
79  Steinhardt (2004, p. 469). While inflation predicts a spectrum of primordial 
gravitational waves, according to the cyclic model there should be no gravitational 
signature. For a survey of the new cyclic model, see Kragh (2011, pp. 202-208). 
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this case it is not the demarcation criterion which is in focus but rather 
Popper’s critical rationalism and general attitude to science and philosophy.80 
 It is not difficult to find more examples of the influence of 
Popperianism on the views of modern cosmologists than those already 
mentioned, and a few more will be cited in the following section. Yet it is 
clear from the literature, both in cosmology and in other sciences, that 
Popper and the methodological rules associated with his name mostly play a 
role in general discussions and only very rarely in research papers. This was 
the case during the earlier cosmological controversy, and it is still the case. 
When cosmologists refer to Popperian criteria of science, it is typically in 
popular books, in review articles of a broad scope, in public lectures, or 
sometimes in conference proceedings. A series of interviews with 
biochemists conducted by Michael Mulkay and Nigel Gilbert indicated that 
although Popper’s philosophical message was well known among them, and 
many of the scientists subscribed to it, his philosophy of science had only 
very limited influence on their actual scientific practice.81  The cosmological 
research literature provides evidence that the situation in cosmology is about 
the same. 
 Few of the scientists commenting on the merits or faults of Popper’s 
philosophy of science have actually read him, but rely on what they have 
been told or happen to know. This results in discussions that are often 
simplistic and sometimes based on misunderstandings. What cosmologists 
(and other scientists) discuss is most often naïve falsificationism rather than 
                                                          
80  Gal-Or (1981), with a foreword by Popper. Using “the criterion of scientific 
testability, refutability and falsifiability,” Gal-Or concludes that the Planck length, as 
given by √      ≅ 10-33 cm, is a “myth” (p. 242). 
81  Mulkay and Gilbert (1981). 
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the sophisticated versions of authentic Popperianism.82 In a lecture in Cracow 
in 1973, the anthropic cosmological principle was introduced by 31-year old 
astrophysicist Brandon Carter. He soon realized that the principle disagreed 
with generally accepted standards of physics, such as Popper’s emphasis on 
predictivity and falsifiability. Carter was at the time aware of Popper’s ideas, 
but without having studied them.83 In a paper of 1983 he criticized “the 
doctrine that scientific theories are never verifiable but only falsifiable,” 
arguing that the Popperian doctrine implied that “all existing theories are not 
only falsifiable, but may safely be assumed in advance to be false.”84  
 Six years later Carter amplified his attack on “the widespread 
misunderstanding that has led to undiscriminating insistence on the 
requirement that a theory should satisfy the requirement of ‘refutability’.” If 
a consequence of a theory is confirmed, he argued, it is turned from a 
hypothesis into a fact, and then it ceases to be refutable; and yet the strength 
of the theory increases. However, this misrepresents the Popperian view, for 
according to Popper confirmation merely corroborates a theory, it does not 
change its degree of falsifiability. In any case, Carter believed that, “far from 
being indispensable, such ‘refutability’ is definitely less satisfactory 
(scientifically) than an equal amount of (irrefutable) ‘verified postdictive 
output’ provided the latter is deduced logically from the same amount of 
independently hypothesised input information.”85 While Carter and a few 
                                                          
82  Heller (2009, pp. 88-89). 
83  In an e-mail to the author of 6 February 2010, Carter wrote: “Simplified folklore 
versions of Popper’s falsifiability criterion (and Ockham’s razor criterion) were 
already familiar to me – from coffee table discussions – when I was a student, but I 
did not get to know about Kuhn’s very apposite ideas until much later.” 
Reproduced with the permission of B. Carter. 
84  Carter (1983, p. 352). 
85  Carter (1989, p. 194). For Carter’s ideas and the historical context of the 
controversial anthropic principle, see Kragh (2011, pp. 217-254). 
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other proponents of the anthropic principle objected to the norms of 
falsificationism (or what they took to be the norms), antagonists considered 
the conflict between the norms and anthropic reasoning as an indication that 
the latter did not belong to science. One of the antagonists, the American 
physicist Heinz Pagels, claimed in 1985 that the anthropic principle was 
untestable and “immune to experimental falsification – a sure sign that it is 
not a scientific principle.”86 
 
7  Multiverse and Popperianism 
Together with string theory and the inflationary scenario, the anthropic 
hypothesis is a key element in the modern hypothesis of the “multiverse” 
that for a decade or so has been hotly debated in the cosmology community. 
According to this hypothesis or proposal, our universe is only one instance 
among a huge ensemble of universes and perhaps the only one privileged by 
the existence of intelligent and cognizable beings. The numerous other 
universes are causally disconnected from ours, hence unobservable in 
principle.87 They may have their own laws of physics, own content of 
elementary particles, and perhaps even their own number of space-time 
dimensions. While some physicists and cosmologists are enthusiastic 
advocates of the multiverse, others tend to dismiss it as an interesting but 
unscientific speculation. 
                                                          
86  Pagels (1990, p. 177). Neither Pagels in 1985 nor Carter in his publications of 1983 
and 1989 mentioned Popper by name. 
87  There are different kinds of multiverse models, and in some of them the constants 
of nature and basic laws of physics are the same in all universes. On the multiverse 




 One problem with the multiverse hypothesis is that the excessive 
amount of universes seems to allow almost any physical state of affairs – if 
not in our universe, then in some other. This, together with the 
unobservability of the other universes, makes the multiverse problematic, 
not to say unacceptable, from a Popperian point of view. According to 
Popper’s philosophy, a scientific theory must be falsifiable and therefore set 
constraints to the results of possible observations: “Every ‘good’ scientific 
theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen,” as he said in a 
lecture of 1953. “The more a theory forbids, the better it is.”88 At least in some 
versions, multiverse cosmology suffers from an extreme lack of 
prohibitiveness.  
 In the ongoing controversy over the multiverse Popper’s views play 
a significant role, sometimes explicitly and at others times implicitly. Do 
multiverse theories qualify as scientific according to Popperian standards? 
Consider Lee Smolin, a leading theoretical cosmologist and critic of the 
multiverse and anthropic reasoning in physics:  
 According to Popper, a theory is falsifiable if one can derive from it 
unambiguous predictions for practical experiments, such that – were 
contrary results seen – at least one premise of the theory would have 
been proven not true. … Confirmation of a prediction of a theory 
does not show that the theory is true, but falsification of a prediction 
can show it is false.89  
                                                          
88  Popper (1963, p. 36). 
89  Smolin (2007, pp. 323-324). Emphasis added. Smolin’s Popperian view of science 
is not unlike the one earlier espoused by Bondi. See also Smolin (2008, p. 369), where 
he proudly declares himself a “Popperazo.”  
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Smolin even goes as far as arguing that “scientists have an ethical imperative 
to consider only falsifiable theories as possible explanations of natural 
phenomena.” Also Burton Richter, a Nobel laureate in physics, appeals to 
“Karl Popper’s definition of science” in his attack on the anthropic 
multiverse. This supposed definition – that science is limited to “models with 
testable and falsifiable consequences” – rules out multiverse cosmology and 
relegates it to the domain of metaphysics.90 
 While Smolin and some other critics dismiss the multiverse on the 
ground that it violates Popper’s demarcation criterion for science, it speaks to 
the authority of this criterion that it is invoked also by some cosmologists 
favourably inclined to the multiverse hypothesis. For example, Mario Livio 
(who is one such cosmologist) emphasizes that a theory that cannot be tested 
even in principle can hardly be counted as scientific. It “goes against the 
principles of the scientific method, and in particular it violates the basic 
concept that every scientific theory should be falsifiable,” he says.91 Another 
sympathizer, the French cosmologist Aurélien Barrau, maintains that “the 
multiverse remains within the realm of Popperian science,” although he adds 
that “falsifiability is just one criterion among many possible ones.”92 Again, 
Max Tegmark, proposing a multiverse theory of the TOE (theory of 
everything) kind, discusses its relation to Popper’s “hardly controversial” 
falsifiability criterion. Rather than questioning the criterion, he argues that 
                                                          
90  Richter (2006). The misunderstanding that Popper’s demarcation criterion is a 
definition of science is widespread among scientists and science writers. Thus, an 
article on multiverse cosmology carrying the subtitle “Do we need to change the 
definition of science?” speaks of falsifiability as the “defining characteristic of real 
science,” whereas Popper considered it a proposal scientists can decide to follow 
(Matthews 2008). 
91  Livio (2000, p. 187). 
92  Barrau (2007). 
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“the TOE we have proposed makes a large number of statistical predictions, 
and therefore can eventually be ruled out.”93  
 Other multiverse physicists admit that the multiverse is hardly 
reconcilable with Popperian standards of science, but they tend to consider 
the tension a virtue rather than a problem. Leonard Susskind, one of the 
fathers of the modern multiverse hypothesis and an ardent advocate of it, has 
no respect at all for Popper and the “Popperazi” who follow him. Here is 
Susskind’s opinion of the falsifiability criterion and what he calls 
“overzealous Popperism”:   
Throughout my long experience as a scientist I have heard 
unfalsifiability hurled at so many important ideas that I am inclined 
to think that no idea can have great merit unless it has drawn this 
criticism. … Good scientific methodology is not an abstract set of 
rules dictated by philosophers. ... Falsification, in my opinion, is a 
red herring, but confirmation is another story.94  
What Susskind refers to as confirmation includes mathematical consistency, 
which he and other string physicists rate highly as a method of testing. In 
this context it should be pointed out that Popper (probably unknown to 
Susskind) also included internal consistency as a way of testing a theory. In 
Logic of Scientific Discovery he distinguished between four different lines 
along which a theory can be tested, and only one of them was empirical 
                                                          
93  Tegmark (1998, p. 1 and p. 42). This is one of the few research papers with specific 
references to Popper’s demarcation criterion.  
94  Susskind (2006, pp. 193-195). 
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testing or falsification. He considered self-consistency to be a criterion 
formally analogous to falsification.95 
 More could be said about the role of Popperian standards in the 
modern debate of whether the universe is unique or a multiverse consisting 
of different universes. I have merely intended to illustrate that the legacy of 
Popper is still very much alive in twenty-first century cosmology. 
 
8  Conclusion 
Whereas Popper dealt extensively and critically with problems in statistical 
physics and quantum mechanics, he had disappointingly little to say about 
the new kind of physical cosmology that emerged and matured during his 
own career as a philosopher.96 He followed the development from the 
sideline, but without examining any of the rival cosmologies from the 
perspective of his philosophy of science. In regard of the role that his views 
played in the steady state controversy, and the appeal to Popperian 
standards that Bondi highlighted in particular, this is somewhat surprising. 
From Popper’s scattered remarks, supplemented with his testimony of 1994, 
it seems safe to conclude that he was sceptical with regard to the scientific 
status of cosmology. He had a certain preference for the falsifiable steady 
state theory, whereas he came to see the successful big bang theory as 
essentially ad hoc and unscientific. At the end of his life he expressed in 
                                                          
95  Popper (1959, pp. 32, 92, and 314). Although distinguishing sharply between 
falsification and confirmation, Popper did not necessarily give priority to empirical 
falsification. 
96  The absence in Popper’s books and articles of discussions of modern cosmology is 
only surprising in the light of the role that his ideas played among cosmologists 
during his own lifetime. Most other prominent philosophers of science – including 
Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Larry Laudan – also ignored the 
new developments in physical cosmology. 
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strong words his dislike of the big bang theory, especially for methodological 
reasons (Section 5). He characterized the methods on which the theory built 
as “intolerable,” “impermissible,” and “against scientific ethics.” 
 From about 1955 and until the present Popper’s ideas have been 
highly visible in the development of cosmology – much more so than the 
ideas of other philosophers, including Thomas Kuhn. It appears that the 
significance of his views has been largely limited to periods of conceptual 
uncertainty or rivalry between competing models. References to Popper, 
sometimes explicit and at other times implicit, appear frequently in the 
popular literature and general discussions, but only very rarely in the 
research papers. Another feature worth noticing, and one which is not 
peculiar to cosmology, is that the version of Popperianism that is discussed 
in scientific and semi-scientific contexts is almost always a simplified folklore 
version. This was the case in the 1950s, and it is still the case. Popper’s views 
of what characterizes science and how it progresses are often distorted and 
frequently boiled down to the seductively simple  formula that a non-
falsifiable theory is unscientific per definition. This is a formula that has little 
to do with authentic Popperian philosophy. 
 How unique is the case here described? The views of philosophers 
have played a role in many other sciences in the modern period, but they 
have usually been detached from the actual research practices. Most often 
they have been interpretations of what has happened, retrospective 
evaluations of recent developments. In some fields of the biological sciences 
Popperian standards have been influential, and it has been discussed what 
these standards really are and if biological theories should live up to them.97 
Another case of possible relevance to the one here discussed is the plate 
                                                          
97  Helfenbein and DeSalle (2005). Rieppel (2008).  
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tectonics “revolution” of the 1960s, where it was Kuhn’s philosophy rather 
than Popper’s that entered the discussion.98 However, this mostly occurred 
post factum, in attempts to establish whether or not the development that led 
to the new picture of the mobile Earth followed a pattern of the kind argued 
by Kuhn. The case is nevertheless relevant because it shares with the one of 
cosmology the feature that philosophies of science were discussed by the 
scientists themselves and, to some extent, became part of the scientific 
discourse.99  
 
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the Karl Popper Library at Klagenfurt 
University for permission to quote from Popper’s letter. 
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